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Abstract
Recently Cator & Landsman made a comparison between Bell’s Theorem and Conway &
Kochen’s Strong Free Will Theorem. Their overall conclusion was that the latter is stronger in
that it uses fewer assumptions, but also that it has two shortcomings. Firstly, no experimental
test of the Conway-Kochen Theorem has been performed thus far, and, secondly, because the
Conway-Kochen Theorem is strongly connected to the Kochen-Specker Theorem it may be
susceptible to the finite precision loophole of Meyer, Kent and Clifton. In this paper I show
that the finite precision loophole does not apply to the Conway-Kochen Theorem.
1 Introduction
Somewhat loosely speaking, both Bell’s Theorem [6, 14] and the (Strong) Free Will Theorem of
Conway and Kochen (Conway-Kochen Theorem in this paper) [17, 18] show the impossibility of
local deterministic hidden variable theories for quantum mechanics. Obviously, if there is a concrete
distinction between the two results, it has to lie in the details. Recently, Cator & Landsman [13]
made an investigation of these details by reformulating both theorems in a single framework that
allows comparison. They concluded that “the Strong Free Will Theorem uses fewer assumptions
than Bell’s 1964 Theorem, as no appeal to probability theory is made, but this comes at a double
price. Firstly, in the absence of an Aspect-type experiment using spin-one particles, the former
so far has no experimental backing. Secondly, through its use of the Kochen-Specker Theorem as
a lemma, the Strong Free Will Theorem is potentially vulnerable to the kind of ‘finite precision’
challenge discussed (most recently) in [3, 5, 25].”
In this paper I provide a fifty percent discount on the Conway-Kochen Theorem by showing
that the finite precision loophole can be closed. In section 2 the Kochen-Specker Theorem is
formulated using the framework introduced in [13], and I explain that the finite precision loophole
attacks a specific assumption that underlies the theorem. In section 3 it is highlight that this
same assumption also underlies the Conway-Kochen Theorem. However, I then show that, while
relaxing this assumption does allow the possibility of noncontextual deterministic hidden variables
(a possibility often alleged to be excluded by the Kochen-Specker Theorem), it does not allow
for the possibility of local deterministic hidden variables. More precisely, I argue that with a
slight reformulation of one of the other assumptions underlying the Conway-Kochen Theorem, the
theorem still holds. The main asset of the theorem (that it doesn’t make use of probability theory)
remains intact.
2 Finite Precision and the Kochen-Specker Theorem
2.1 Introduction
In a slogan, the Kochen-Specker Theorem [31] is often taken to prove “the impossibility of non-
contextual hidden variable theories”. But as with any foundational result there are footnotes to
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be placed by the slogan. One of them is that, actually, the theorem only proves this impossibil-
ity under the assumption that a certain set of self-adjoint operators in the quantum formalism
corresponds to observables. And this assumption may be contested.
The idea that not all self-adjoint operators may correspond to observables has been around for
some time: Wigner [41] already wondered whether one could meaningfully attribute an observable
to operators such as X +P (the sum of the position and momentum operator). However, it is one
thing to argue that not all self-adjoint operators need to correspond to observables, but another to
argue of a specific set of self-adjoint operators that they in fact do not correspond to observables.
And it is an argument of the latter type that is needed to disprove the Kochen-Specker slogan.
Such an argument was first provided by Meyer [33] and then further developed in [5, 16, 25, 29]. It
exploits the idea that actual measurements only have a finite precision while the Kochen-Specker
Theorem makes use of the idealization of infinite precision. In this section I quickly rehearse the
Kochen-Specker Theorem and the finite precision argument. This then allows for a concrete study
of how the finite precision argument affects the Conway-Kochen Theorem in section 3.
2.2 Reformulation of the Kochen-Specker Theorem
The Kochen-Specker Theorem revolves around the quantum theory of spin-1 particles which in turn
are modeled on the Hilbert space C3. With every unit vector a in R3 is associated a self-adjoint
operator Sa denoting the spin along the a-axis. Since Sa is associated with the axis spanned by
a one has Sa = S−a. Thus there is a one-to-one correspondence between spin operators Sa and
1-dimensional projection operators Pa acting on R
3 (Pav = 〈a, v〉a). One-dimensional projection
operators in turn can be associated with points on the 2-sphere S2 where opposite points are then
being identified with each other.
A frame in R3 will be an ordered triple a = [Pa1 , Pa2 , Pa3 ] of 1-dimensional projection operators
with {a1, a2, a3} an orthonormal basis of R
3. The set of all frames will be denoted by F . For every
frame a ∈ F the operators S2a1 , S
2
a2
, S2a3 are pairwise commuting, have spectrum {0, 1}, and sum
to two times the identity. Thus quantum theory predicts that (under the assumption that these
operators correspond to observables) a joint measurement of these operators yields a result from
the set
T := {(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)}. (1)
An essential role in Kochen-Specker type arguments is played by frame functions. A frame
function on O is a function λ : O ⊂ F → T such that
∀a, a′ ∈ O : ∃i, j s.t. Pai = Pa′j ⇒ λi(a) = λj(a
′). (2)
The idea of a frame function is that it attributes values to operators in a noncontextual way
(independent of the frame under consideration). This is elucidated by noting that every frame
function gives rise to a function c : D(O) ⊂ S2 → {0, 1} with D(O) the set of points a for which
there is a frame a ∈ O with Pai = Pa for some i and
c(a) := λi(a). (3)
This function is an example of a coloring function. That is, a function c : D ⊂ S2 → {0, 1} is
called a coloring function on D if
1. c(a) = c(−a) whenever a,−a ∈ D,
2. c(a1) + c(a2) + c(a3) = 2 whenever [Pa1 , Pa2 , Pa3 ] is a frame and a1, a2, a3 ∈ D,
3. c(a1) + c(a2) ≥ 1 whenever a1⊥a2 and a1, a2 ∈ D.
The main mathematical result on which the Kochen-Specker Theorem builds can now be for-
mulated.
Lemma 1. There exists no frame function on F . Equivalently, there is no coloring function on
S2.
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Somewhat intuitively, this already establishes the impossibility of attributing definite values to
all self-adjoint operators in a noncontextual way. But the precise philosophical importance can
only be highlighted by selecting out concrete assumptions that together require the existence of a
frame function on F . Here I present a set of assumptions that is close the the formulation used in
[13].
• Determinism There exists a set X together with a surjective function A : X → OA ⊂ F
and a function F : X → T .
The associated interpretation is that OA selects out the frames a for which there is an observable
corresponding to the joint measurement of S2a1 , S
2
a2
, S2a3 . With a slight abuse of language I will call
the frames in OA observables. An element x ∈ X then determines both the observable A(x) to be
measured and the outcome of the measurement F (x).
• Value Definiteness There are functions Z : X → XZ and Fˆ : OA ×XZ → T such that
F (x) = Fˆ (A(x), Z(x)) ∀x ∈ X. (4)
This assumption establishes that for every z ∈ XZ there is a function λz : OA → T given by
λz(a) := Fˆ (a, z) . (5)
Intuitively z takes on the role of a hidden variable state and the intended reading is that while x
only assigns a definite value to the observable that is determined to be measured, the existence of
Fˆ ensures that all observables that are not measured also have a definite value. But it may also be
noted that without any further constraints this assumption is empty as one may just take XZ = X
and Z = id. Further constraints are then given by the following assumption.1
• Noncontextuality For every z ∈ XZ , λz is a frame function on OA.
The idea behind this assumption is that the elements of a frame a or, equivalently, the operators
S2ai have an ontological status independent of the frame in which they are considered. That is, the
value assigned to S2ai via (λz(a))i only depends on z and not on a.
It is this last assumption that is often taken to be ruled out for hidden variable theories by the
Kochen-Specker theorem (taking Determinism and Value Definiteness as indispensable ingredients
for such a theory). In fact, the first argument against the assumption is due to Bell and actually
predates the Kochen-Specker Theorem [7]. In his “judo-like manoeuvre” [37] he argued that Bohr
already time and again emphasized that outcomes of experiments cannot be separated from the
experimental setup used, and that there is no reason to suppose that this essential ingredient
to the Copenhagen interpretation should be something to be denied in a hidden variable theory.
However, this maneuver is not forced upon the proponent of hidden variables by the Kochen-
Specker Theorem because, to connect the framework described thus far with Lemma 1, one final
assumption is required.
• Identification Principle Every frame corresponds to an observable, i.e., OA = F .
These assumptions together allow the following formulation of the Kochen-Specker Theorem.
Theorem 1. Determinism, Value Definiteness, Noncontextuality and the Identification Principle
are mutually exclusive.
2.3 The Finite Precision Loophole
It should be mentioned that the theorem actually proven by Kochen-Specker is significantly stronger
than the one formulated here. That is, Theorem 1 also holds when the Identification Principle is
restricted to a specific finite subset of frames OKS . That is, the assumption OA = F may be
replaced by OA ⊃ OKS . In the original proof OKS consists of 133 frames constructed from
1This way of introducing hidden variable states is perhaps somewhat cumbersome, but it will be helpful for
seeing the analogy with the Conway-Kochen Theorem in the next section.
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117 vectors, and many improvements of the proof have been introduced since that use smaller
sets.2 Also, another strengthening of the Kochen-Specker Theorem has been proven recently,
which establishes that for any pair of vectors one can construct a finite set of frames for which the
theorem holds [1, 2].
These results all focus on the minimal requirements for a set O ⊂ F to be such that there does
not exist a frame function on O. What they leave open is the question of how big O can be such
that frame functions on O do exist. It was shown by Meyer, Kent and Clifton that this set can in
fact be quite big:
Theorem 2. There exist sets OMKC that admit frame functions and that are dense in F in the
sense that for every ǫ > 0, for every a ∈ F there is an a′ ∈ OMKC such that
max
i
min
j
‖Pai − Pa′j‖ < ǫ. (6)
Consequently, D(OMKC) is dense in S
2 in the usual sense.
Meyer showed in [33] that one can take the set of frames
{
[Pa1 , Pa2 , Pa3 ] ∈ F
∣
∣ ai ∈ Q3
}
. (7)
This result was further generalized by Kent and Clifton who showed that for any finite-dimensional
Hilbert space a set OMKC can be constructed such that all frames in it are totally incompatible [16,
29]. This means that for every unit vector ai there is at most one frame in OMKC containing Pai .
The existence of frame functions on OMKC then becomes a triviality. Furthermore, it allows one
to show that there are enough frame functions such that every quantum state can be represented
by a probability distribution over these frame functions [16, 25].
At first sight it looks like one arrives at a stalemate concerning the possibility of noncontextual
hidden variable theories. If OKS ⊂ OA for some Kochen-Specker set OKS , then noncontextuality
fails. If on the other hand OA ⊂ OMKC , then noncontextuality is a possibility. The finite precision
argument is the tiebreaker here. The idea is that due to the finite precision of measurements, one
cannot establish with infinite precision which frame is selected out from F when a measurement
is performed. Thus on this view the Identification Principle can be weakened to obtain something
like the following.
• Identification PrincipleFP For every frame a ∈ F there is an observable a
′ ∈ OA such
that a and a′ are empirically indistinguishable.
Theorem 2 establishes that this principle can be maintained: no matter how precisely a frame is
determined experimentally, there are always frames within OMKC compatible with it. The set of
frames OMKC is thus rich enough to reproduce all the empirical predictions one could make under
the assumption that F is the set of ‘real’ frames. The upshot is that the finite precision loophole
allows the construction of noncontextual hidden variable theories that respect the Kochen-Specker
Theorem by giving up the Identification Principle. In the next section I show that even though the
same principle is adopted in the proof of the Conway-Kochen Theorem, it can not be exploited to
undermine the import of the theorem, being, the impossibility of a deterministic local theory that
is compatible with ‘free will’. But before discussing this result I want to make two final remarks.
First, the noncontextual MKC-models are surely counterintuitive and therefore have yielded
quite some criticism in a wide variety. Some have tried to dismiss the MKC-models as viable
possibilities by arguing that they cannot reproduce all empirical predictions of quantum mechanics
(such as [12]), while others have focused more on the unsatisfactory aspects of the models them-
selves (e.g. [3]). For the details on these objections and possible responses I refer the reader to
the discussions in [3, 5, 23, 25] and references therein. However, there is one recent objection that
deserves a quick response It focuses on the observation that the restriction to a proper subset of
frames may be interpreted as the impossibility to align a spin-measurement device along a certain
2In three dimensions Conway and Kochen hold the record for the smallest number of vectors (31) [35, p. 114].
The constructions of Peres [35, p. 198] and Bub [11] both use 33 vectors of which the latter requires the least number
of frames of all these results. Recently, the number of contexts has been minimized to 7 for the Hilbert space C6
[32]. For more discussion on comparing sizes of Kochen-Specker sets see [9, 34] and references therein.
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axis in real space. In [23] this is taken to indicate the non-existence of these directions in real
space. While this is a subtle step that may deserve some debate, I’d only like to point out that the
continuity of space itself is not an innocent assumption to be upheld for a hidden variable theory.
Furthermore, with the advancements in current physics, it is not unlikely that this assumption is
to be dropped anyway as for example in loop quantum gravity (c.f. [38] for a friendly conceptual
introduction.).
Second, the Kochen-Specker Theorem may also be avoided by dropping one of the assumptions
Determinism or Value Definiteness. And one can argue for the possibility of noncontextual in-
terpretations of quantum mechanics along those lines. Although on the present presentation this
would require a reformulation of Noncontextuality (because it relies on the earlier assumptions
being true), a sketch of such arguments can still be given. Consider someone who takes Deter-
minism seriously. Then the state of the world determines which observable is to be measurement
and the outcome of this measurement. And nothing more seems to be needed to explain what we
actually observe. There is then no reason to assume that unmeasured observables also should have
a definite value (i.e., Value Definiteness is abandoned). In fact, one may argue that unmeasured
observables are not observables at all, and the value attribution given by Determinism may then
be considered to be noncontextual. Another possibility is to argue that Determinism fails as it
does for example in the consistent histories approach. For an argument that Noncontextuality can
be saved on this view see [22]. This all demonstrates that the slogan that “the Kochen-Specker
Theorem shows that Nature is contextual” is even more reckless than the one I started with in this
section.
3 Finite Precision and the Conway-Kochen Theorem
3.1 The Conway-Kochen Theorem
The Conway-Kochen Theorem [17, 18] is preceded by a long history of investigations making use
of the main ingredient of the theorem: a system of two entangled spin-1 particles. This history
starts with Heywood and Redhead [26] who used this system to investigate the relation between
Noncontextuality (as assumed in the Kochen-Specker Theorem) and Locality (as assumed in the
derivation of any Bell-inequality). Since then it has also occurred in [10, 15, 39] and (unsurprisingly)
it has been claimed that Conway and Kochen haven’t proven anything that wasn’t already known
[21]. I tend to disagree with this view (c.f. [24, §4.4.4]) and this disagreement is backed up by
Cator and Landsman [13]. What their paper shows is that the Conway-Kochen Theorem can
be understood as an adaption of the Kochen-Specker Theorem to provide an argument against
local determinism that is independent of the Bell-type argument instead of a reformulation or
investigation thereof. This independence comes with a prize, and one of them is that the theorem
may be susceptible to the finite precision loophole.
To investigate this, the theorem has to be formulated in a way that elucidates where the
Identification Principle comes in as an assumption. This is done by making a slight adaption
to the assumptions introduced in [13]. The setting is a two agent version of the Kochen-Specker
Theorem discussed in the previous section.
• Determinism There exists a set X together with surjective functions
A : X → OA ⊂ F , B : X → OB ⊂ F (8)
and functions F,G : X → T where A and B represent the performed measurements and F
and G their outcomes.
• Parameter Independence There are functions Z : X → XZ and
Fˆ : OA ×XZ → T, Gˆ : OB ×XZ → T (9)
such that
F (x) = Fˆ (A(x), Z(x)), G(x) = Gˆ(B(x), Z(x)) ∀x ∈ X. (10)
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• Freedom (A,B,Z) are independent in the sense that for all (a,b, z) ∈ OA × OB × XZ
there is an x ∈ X such that (A(x), B(x), Z(x)) = (a,b, z), i.e., the three component function
(A,B,Z) is surjective.
• Identification Principle Every frame corresponds to an observable: OA = OB = F .
When comparing with the Kochen-Specker Theorem, one finds that Parameter Independence
replaces Value Definiteness. And though, like Value Definiteness, Parameter Independence is an
empty assumption without any further constraints, it is in fact a stronger assumption. Value
Definiteness for the two particle system only requires the existence of a function Vˆ : OA ×OB ×
XZ → T×T such that Vˆ (A(x), B(x), Z(x)) = (F (x), G(x)) while Parameter Independence requires
in addition that Vˆ factorizes in two functions Fˆ and Gˆ. It thus embodies that the settings a and
b can be selected independently. The freedom assumption further establishes that this selection is
free in the sense that it is not constrained by the definite values assigned to each setting by x.
Finally, the Conway-Kochen Theorem requires an empirical assumption:
• Nature For any pair of frames a = [Pa1 , Pa2 , Pa3 ],b = [Pb1 , Pb2 , Pb3 ] if there are i, j such
that Pai = Pbj , then
Fˆi(a, z) = Gˆj(b, z) ∀z ∈ XZ . (11)
The Conway-Kochen Theorem then states:
Theorem 3. Determinism, Parameter Independence, Freedom, the Identification Principle and
Nature are mutually exclusive.
3.2 Closing the Finite Precision Loophole
Although the proof for Theorem 3 may be found in [13], to get a better grip on the role of the
Identification Principle it is useful to prove it again with a small detour.
Lemma 2. If OA = OB, then Determinism, Parameter Independence, Freedom and Nature imply
the existence of a frame function on OA.
Proof. First of all, Determinism and Parameter Independence together imply that for every z ∈ XZ
λz : OA → T, λz(a) := Fˆ (a, z) (12)
is well-defined. It remains to be proven that λz is a frame function on OA. Now suppose that
a, a′ ∈ OA and there are i, j such that Pai = Pa′j . Since OA = OB there are b,b
′ ∈ OB such
that a = b, a′ = b′. Because of Freedom for every z ∈ XZ there are x, x
′ ∈ X such that
(A(x), B(x), Z(x)) = (a,b, z) and (A(x′), B(x′), Z(x′)) = (a′,b, z). It then follows from Nature
that
λz(a)i = Fˆi(a, z) = Gˆi(b, z) = Fˆj(a
′, z) = λz(a
′)j . (13)
Thus λz is a frame function on OA.
The proof of Theorem 3 now follows from this lemma together with Lemma 1 and the Identifi-
cation Principle. It is thus tempting to believe that replacing the Identification Principle with its
finite precision version may be sufficient to block the proof. Formally, this is indeed true. If one
takes OA = OB = OMKC all premises can be satisfied. The Nature premise then amounts to the
restriction that x is such that
Fˆ (a, z) = Gˆ(b, z) (14)
whenever a = b. This sparks the idea that there is an even more trivial way to ensure consistency:
one could choose OA and OB such that they have no one-dimensional projections in common.
That is, they are chosen such that the antecedent of Nature is never fulfilled.
This possibility demonstrates that the formulation of Nature is more strict than its intended
meaning. Nature is supposed to be an empirical constraint and this requires that the antecedent
poses an experimental possibility. Here one finds that the finite precision argument is a double-
edged sword: not only does it allow for a weakening of the Identification Principle, but it also
justifies a strengthening of the Nature assumption. Somewhat loosely, it allows the following
reformulation.
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• NatureFP For any pair of frames a = [Pa1 , Pa2 , Pa3 ], b = [Pb1 , Pb2 , Pb3 ], if there are i, j such
that ‖Pai − Pbj‖ is small, then in most of the cases
Fˆi(a, z) = Gˆj(b, z). (15)
In fact, an experimental validation of Nature would imply an experimental validation of NatureFP.
Roughly, this amounts to the demand that the coloring function cz generated by λz via (3) is
continuous on most of the points in D(OA). Now it doesn’t matter much in which way one wishes
to make the notion of ‘most of the points’ precise; any reasonable definition will lead to trouble.
This is because it was shown by Appleby [3] that for every coloring function c on a dense subset
D ⊂ S2 there is a non-empty open region D ⊂ S2 such that c is densely discontinuous on D ∩D.
That is, for every point a ∈ D ∩D and every neighborhood U of a there is a point a′ ∈ U ∩D ∩D
such that c(a) 6= c(a′). Then, whenever Determinism, Parameter Independence and Freedom are
taken to hold, and OA and OB are assumed to be dense in F in the MKC-sense, NatureFP fails.
This is because no matter how precise the directions of a triad can be determined, there are always
frames a, a′ ∈ OA that are so close to each other that they cannot be distinguished empirically
and such that
Fˆi(a, z) 6= Fˆj(a
′, z), (16)
where ai and a
′
j are the directions that align with each other. In short, one has the following:
Theorem 4. Determinism, Parameter Independence, Freedom, the Identification PrincipleFP and
NatureFP are mutually exclusive.
4 Remarks and Conclusion
It has been shown that although formally the finite precision loophole that applies to the Kochen-
Specker Theorem also applies to the Conway-Kochen Theorem, this loophole can be closed once it
is recognized that the Nature assumption is an empirical assumption rather than one of principle
(which does apply to the other assumptions). Consequently, if an experimental test of the Conway-
Kochen Theorem were to be performed (which would constitute an empirical validation of Nature
for some set of frames (approximately) within an uncolorable set), the test would also close the
finite precision loophole. This reminds one of the second disadvantage of the Conway-Kochen
Theorem as noted by Cator & Landsman: thus far no experimental test of the theorem has been
performed. If, however, one assumes confidence in the possibility of experimentally testing the
theorem and that the results will be in favor of it, then I can only agree with their conclusion that
the theorem has a big advantage over Bell’s Theorem by not using probability theory. Indeed, the
role of probability in Bell’s Theorem has played a significant (albeit sometimes implicit) role in
the discussion of what the theorem actually tells us about the world.3 Hence it is safe to conclude
that the Conway-Kochen Theorem does provide a valuable contribution to the foundational debate
even though this wasn’t immediately clear when it was first published.
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